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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

in this case

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Should the Court uphold the trial court's decision, and
decline to review Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, where Defendant does not enumerate all the incriminatory
facts and/or inferences against him?
Should the Court uphold the trial court's decision, following
a bench trial, to find Defendant guilty of Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, where Defendant was passed out
behind the wheel of a running vehicle, where Defendant showed
multiple signs of compromised coordination, balance and coherence,
and where Defendant admitted that he was taking medication that was
not his own?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A trial court's verdict in a criminal trial will be set aside
only if that verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or
x

if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.'" City of Orem v. Lee, 846
P.2d 450, 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)) .

1

APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502. Driving under the influence
of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or with
specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration.
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's
body that a subsequent chemical test shows
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the
time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle;
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation or actual physical control.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation
under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted
in compliance with Section 41-6a-510.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David Kole Wright, was charged, by Information,
with Driving on a Suspended or Revoked Operators License (Alcohol
Related), pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 53-3-227 (3) (a),
and Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6a-502. R. 1-3. Plaintiff later
dismissed the suspension charge prior to trial, R. 41:4, and the
trial court convicted Defendant of DUI. R. 41:31.
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The court arraigned Defendant on May 11, 2009, R. 6-8, the
parties participated in a pretrial conference on June 22, 2009, R.
12, and the court tried the matter on July 20, 2009. R. 41. At the
conclusion of the bench trial, the court found Defendant guilty of
DUI.

R.

41:31.

The

trial

court

then

sentenced

Defendant

on

September 14, 2009. R. 26-28. His sentence included 180 days jail,
with 170 days suspended, a fine of $1250, and a 30-month term of
probation. R. 26-28. On October 13, 2009, Defendant, through his
trial/appellate counsel, Joel D. Berrett, filed his Notice of
Appeal. R. 30-31.
Defendant's conviction for DUI stems from his activities on
November 10, 2008. R. 41:6. On that date, dispatch informed the
Roosevelt City police that there were reports of a man who appeared
to be passed out in his vehicle at the Western Hills Motel in
Roosevelt. R. 41:6. Officer Henry McKenna, a police officer with
more than nine years of experience, R. 41:25, and an employee of
the Roosevelt

Police

Department,

responded

to the

site, and

encountered "several people flaggfing] [him] down,7' R. 41:6-7, to
point out a Suburban with a male who appeared to be passed out in
the driver's seat. R. 41:7. The vehicle "was right at the entrance
to the west side of the parking lot." R. 41:6. Officer McKenna
approached the vehicle, and found that the vehicle was running with
the keys in the ignition, R. 41:7-8, that the driver, was "slumped
over," R. 41:8, appearing unconscious, R. 41:7, and that the
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driver, "at some point[,] had lit a cigarette in his mouth and it
had burned out . . . [leaving] ashes all over his chest." R. 41:7.
The driver was later identified as Defendant, David Kole Wright. R.
41:7-8.
Having

observed

Defendant's

condition,

Officer

McKenna

"pound[ed] on the windows trying to wake [Defendant]." R. 41:9. All
told, in his efforts to rouse Defendant, the officer knocked on the
car windows and the car door for "probably 15 to 20 minutes." R.
41:9. Defendant, however, "[d]idn't flinch, didn't move, didn't do
anything." R. 41:9. Defendant was breathing, but was utterly
unresponsive. R. 41:10.
Having spoken with the management of the motel, Officer
McKenna located Defendant's motel room and talked with Defendant's
girlfriend, who said that she did not have additional keys for the
vehicle. R. 41:10. The officer then attempted to use a rod,
utilized for unlocking vehicles, to gain entry to Defendant's
Suburban. R. 41:10. The officer did not have much success unlocking
the doors, but, in his attempts, he "bumped [Defendant] several
times" with the rod. R. 41:10. After these nudges, Defendant
"move[d] a little bit, so [the officer] continued to prod him with
the pole to . . . wake him." R. 41:10-11. The officer persisted for
about five minutes, at which time Defendant awakened. R. 41:11.
At that point, "[Defendant] was very disoriented . . . .

It

took him a minute to even function to roll the window down." R.
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41:11. Officer McKenna asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle.
R. 41:11. The officer also invited Defendant to turn off the
vehicle's engine, and "[i]t took [Defendant] another minute to do
that." R. 41:11. "[Defendant] . . . tr[ied] to find where to turn
it off. . . . [I]t took him a second to maneuver to turn the
vehicle off. . . . [T]hen he took the keys in and out . . . of the
ignition several times." R. 41:11.
Once Defendant discontinued inserting and removing the keys
from the ignition, he attempted to exit the vehicle, and Officer
McKenna "had to grab him because he almost fell over." R. 41:12.
The officer also assisted Defendant in standing and proceeding to
the back of the vehicle, R. 41:12, and Defendant had to lean
against the vehicle to keep from falling over. R. 41:15. When asked
about whether Defendant performed any field sobriety tests, Officer
McKenna replied, "We did try to do that, but he was so - so
physically unable to maneuver, I didn't feel like it was a safe
opportunity to do that." R. 41:12.
In

speaking

with

Officer

McKenna

during

their

initial

interaction, Defendant denied having consumed any alcohol, R.
41:13,

and

Officer

McKenna

detected

no

odor

of

alcohol

or

marijuana, R. 41:22-23, but, either during that conversation or
during an encounter later that day, Defendant conceded to Officer
McKenna that Defendant had been taking medication, and that it was
not Defendant's medication. R. 41:21. Officer McKenna was able to
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observe Defendant for about 20 to 30 minutes after Defendant exited
the vehicle, and Defendant's "abilities never improved at all," R.
41:14. Not only did Defendant lack balance and have difficulty with
his keys once he was jarred from his inert state, but he also
searched through his wallet approximately six times in a feckless
effort to retrieve his driver's license, before Officer McKenna
finally intervened to find the license for Defendant, R. 41:15, and
Defendant became "verbally abusive" and "disorderly" with the
officers, R. 41:14, resulting in his being placed in a police
vehicle for a time due to this misbehavior and because "he . . .
couldn't stand up." R. 41:14.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant does not fully marshal the evidence. While he
includes many of the facts supporting the decision of the trial
court,

he

also

neglects

important

facts

and

inferences.

Consequently, he has not met the burden of marshaling the evidence,
and the Court need not consider his challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence.
Even if the Court does consider Defendant's challenge to the
sufficiency

of the evidence, there is sufficient

evidence to

support the trial court's verdict. The testifying officer found
Defendant passed out behind the wheel of a vehicle which had its
engine running. Defendant was unresponsive to pounding on the
vehicle and awoke only after being prodded, with a device utilized
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to unlock doors, for roughly five minutes. Once stirred from his
slumber,

Defendant

demonstrated

multiple

manifestations

of

impairment, and his poor condition was not tempered by the time
period of 20 to 30 minutes that the officer observed Defendant once
he

exited

his

vehicle.

Moreover,

either

during

the

initial

interaction that the officer had with Defendant or during an
encounter later in the day, Defendant informed the officer that he
was taking medication and that the medication was not his own.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE,
AND THE COURT, THEREFORE, NEED NOT CONSIDER HIS
CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.

When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a
defendant "must marshal all of the evidence in support"
of the trial court's findings and then establish that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences, is
insufficient to support the findings. Where an appellant
fails to marshal the evidence, th[e] [C]ourt need not
consider that challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence in support of the findings. Rather, th[e]
[C]ourt will assume that the record supports the findings
of the trial court.
Bountiful City v. Stewart, 2006 UT App 483 (unpublished decision)
(quoting State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, flll, 999 P.2d 1252) . "In
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence,
the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every

scrap

of

competent

evidence

introduced

at

trial

which

supports the very findings the appellant resists." State v. Coonce,
2001 UT App 355, 16,

36 P.3d 533 (quoting West Valley City v.
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Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315

(Utah Ct. App. 1991))

(emphasis in original).
In the instant case, Defendant sets forth many of the facts
unfavorable to him, but also neglects important facts. Defendant,
for example, fails to note that Defendant "didn't flinch, didn't
move, didn't do anything" when Officer McKenna pounded on the
vehicle, R. 41:9; that it took Defendant "a minute" to get out of
the car once he rolled the window down, R. 41:11, because he had to
"try[] to find where to turn [the vehicle] off" and "he took the
keys in and out of the ignition several times," R. 41:11, once the
vehicle was turned off, R. 41:11-12; that Officer McKenna "tr[ied]"
to have Defendant perform
Defendant

"was so

field sobriety tests, but, because
physically unable to maneuver,

[the

officer] didn't feel . . . it was . . . safe," R. 41:12; and that,
in the 20 to 30 minutes that Officer McKenna observed Defendant
after

he

exited

the

vehicle,

"[Defendant's]

abilities

never

improved at all." R. 41:14.
Hence, Defendant omits important facts. He also does not
marshal the inferences to be drawn from the facts, such as the
reasonable conclusion that Defendant's state of impairment was so
severe that it was due to an intoxicant, particularly when his
impairment was coupled with his admission that he was taking
medication that was not his own. In sum, Defendant does not marshal
all of the evidence, and the marshaling of some of the evidence or
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even the "marshal [ing] of 'most' of the evidence," Coonce, 2001 UT
App 355, 15, is not enough to meet the marshaling requirement. Id.
at 56.
II.

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS
DEFENDANT, WHERE DEFENDANT
IMPAIRED ABILITIES, AND WHERE
HAD CONSUMED MEDICATIONS WHICH

THE CONVICTION OF
EXHIBITED SEVERELY
HE ADMITTED THAT HE
WERE NOT HIS OWN.

"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence,
[the Court] must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is
^against the clear weight of the evidence, or if

[the Court]

otherwise reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.'" State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, 55, 84 P. 3d 1167
(quoted authorities omitted). "Additionally, Ain those instances in
which the trial court's findings include inferences drawn from the
evidence, [the Court] will not take issue with those inferences
unless the logic upon which their extrapolation from the evidence
is

based

is

so

flawed

as

to

render

the

inference

clearly

erroneous.'" State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, 511, 197 P. 3d 628 (quoted
and cited authorities omitted).
"In Utah, a person may be convicted of DUI if he is driving or
has actual physical control of a vehicle . . . [and] is under the
influence of alcohol, drugs, or any combination Ato a degree that
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.'" State
v. Dyke, 2009 UT App 369, 534, 645 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (1)) . In the instant case, the trial court's
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determination that Defendant was guilty of DUI was supported by
sufficient evidence.
Defendant was found behind the wheel of a vehicle, with the
keys in the ignition and the engine running. R. 41:8-9. He was
clearly in actual physical control of the vehicle.
Furthermore, he was undeniably impaired. Officer McKenna found
Defendant passed out, with a cigarette in his mouth and ashes on
his chest. R. 41:7-8. The officer attempted to awake Defendant,
but, despite his pounding on the vehicle door and windows for 15 to
20 minutes, Defendant did not budge. R. 41:9. Thereafter, Officer
McKenna prodded Defendant with a pole for about five minutes,
before Defendant finally awoke. R. 41:10-11. At that point, though
awakened, Defendant "was very disoriented,'''' R. 41:11, and "[i]t
took him a minute to . . . roll the window down." R. 41:11. Once
the window was down, Defendant had difficulty turning off the
engine, and then injected the keys into, and withdrew the keys
from, the ignition "several times." R. 41:11. As Defendant stepped
out of the vehicle, Officer McKenna "had to grab him because he
almost fell over." R. 41:12. Defendant then had to lean against the
vehicle to keep from falling. R. 41:12. In fact, Defendant's
balance was so deficient that Officer McKenna did not believe it
was safe for Defendant to attempt field sobriety tests. R. 41:12.
Simply stated, Defendant "couldn't stand up." R. 41:14. Defendant's
impairment was also manifest by his inability to recover his
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driver's license from his wallet after roughly six attempts and his
"verbally

abusive" and

"disorderly"

actions

channeled

at the

officers. R. 41:14. What is more, in the 20 to 30 minutes that
Officer McKenna observed Defendant after Defendant exited the
vehicle, Defendant's "abilities never improved at all." R. 41:14.
There can be no question that Defendant was unable to safely
operate a motor vehicle.
Finally,

there

is

sufficient

evidence

that

Defendant's

condition was due to drug use. Defendant was very impaired, but
denied having imbibed any alcohol, R. 41:13, and Officer McKenna
detected

no odor

of

alcohol

or marijuana.

R.

41:13,

22-23.

Additionally, Defendant admitted that he had been taking medication
and that it was "[n]ot his medication." R. 41:21. No evidence was
offered as to any other cause for Defendant's state, R. 41, other
than that he was under the influence of medications that were not
his own.
Defendant advances two alleged defects in the trial court's
decision. He first claims that "the trial court ignored .
evidence

indicating

that

[he] was

not

impaired

by

drugs or

alcohol." Appellant's Br. at 13. Defendant, however, points to
nothing in the record supporting the position, propounded in his
brief, that "[b]ased on the other officer's [sic] observation [sic]
they did not think he was under the influence [sic] any alcohol or
drugs and told officer [sic] McKenna not to get a blood draw."
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Appellant's Br. at 13. Indeed, the testimony of Officer McKenna was
that an agreement was made with Defendant's girlfriend to take
Defendant and leave town. R. 41:19. The reasons for that decision
were not made a part of the record, and the officer in no way
alluded to any purported disagreement among the officers as to
Defendant's impairment or the cause thereof.
Next, Defendant alleges that the trial court inappropriately
shifted the burden of proof to him.1 The trial court, however, did
not shift the burden of proof. The court noted that there was no
evidence to support any finding that Defendant's impairment was due
to anything other than medication, and then stated: "Now, that
doesn't prevent the [cjourt from finding reasonable doubt based
upon the fact that all we have is the statement that he'd been
taking

medication.

But

that

statement

seems

to

explain

his

condition, and there's no other explanation." R. 41:31. Indeed,
whether

Defendant

told

the

officer

that

he

had

been

taking

medication, which was not his own, during the morning interaction

i

It does not appear that this issue was adequately briefed by
Defendant, and "[i]t is well established that a reviewing court
will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). As noted in Thomas,
briefing "requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority. . . . [The appellate] court[s] [are] not ^a depository
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research.'" Id; at 305 (quoted authorities omitted). In his brief,
Defendant cites to a broad statement of the efficacy of the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard, Appellant's Br. at 14, without
offering authorities addressing the specific shortfall he alleges.
12

or at the time of Defendant's second meeting with th€> officers
later

that

day,

the

logical

conclusion

is

that

it

was

the

medication that spawned his extreme impairment.
Furthermore, even in cases where a defendant does offer
evidence contrary to the prosecution's position, which Defendant
did not, it does not foreclose the Court from finding a defendant
guilty. In Orem City v. Cornejo, for instance, "Cornejo assert[ed]
on appeal that the City did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt because he presented evidence that conflicted with the
testimony of the victim." 2003 UT App 396 (unpublished decision).
This Court, however, rejected Cornejo's argument, explaining that
Cornejo had not shown that his conviction was unsupported by
sufficient evidence, but "rather only that the prosecution and the
defense disagreed on many crucial facts, and [that] it [wa]s for
the trier of fact to determine the testimony to believe." Id.
In terms of the general matter of sufficiency of the evidence,
this Court recently encountered circumstances bearing significant
similarities to the case at hand. As in the present controversy, in
Dyke, the defendant contested the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his DUI conviction. 2009 UT App 369, 133. The Court,
however, found that "there was ample evidence . . . that Van Dyke
had consumed enough alcohol to impair his ability to operate a
vehicle

safely," Ld. at 137, recounting

the evidence

of the

defendant's slurred speech, glassy eyes and general "conduct . . .
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exhibit[ing]

a lack

of

control

of his

actions

and

impaired

judgment." Id.
Courts

in

other

states

have

likewise

found

convictions

supported by sufficient evidence in similar circumstances. In
McDonald v. City of Aberdeen, for instance, the court found
sufficient evidence where
[t]he police officer who responded to the scene testified
that he found McDonald slumped over the steering wheel
with the motor running and had to beat on McDonald's
window several times before waking him. The officer
further testified that when McDonald finally woke up, he
was disoriented and looked around as if he was lost.
Similarly, the officer testified that he could smell a
strong odor of alcohol emanating from McDonald and that
when McDonald attempted to exit his car, he had to
support him because McDonald staggered and almost fell.
The officer additionally testified that McDonald was
swaying badly, was very incoherent, and did not know his
whereabouts. McDonald also admitted, according to Officer
Perkins, that he had consumed three beers.
906 So. 2d 774, 776
Borrelli,

the

court

(Miss. Ct. App. 2004). And, in State v.
upheld

a conviction

under

the

following

circumstances:
Here, the [trial] court found sufficient evidence to show
that the defendant was impaired and that her impairment
was caused by a drug or drugs. Specifically, the court
found that the defendant's vehicle was seen by Hudson
weaving across the road and being driven erratically.
Both Adams and Pickering noted the defendant's slurred
speech, glassy eyes, confusion and disorientation. The
defendant stumbled when getting out of her vehicle and
failed two different field sobriety tests. Moreover, the
defendant admitted at the time of the incident that she
was having a bad reaction to an allergy pill. The court
found that she had ingested Tavist-D approximately two
hours before her arrest.
94 Conn. App. 846, 857 (2006).
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In these cases, as in the instant case, no chemical test
established a particular level of consumption, Dyke, 2009 UT App
369, f8,

McDonald, 906 So. 2d at 776, Borrelli, 94 Conn. App. at

853-54, but the odor of alcohol and/or admission of intake, as well
as

the

defendants'

impairment,

evinced

alcohol

or drug use.

Likewise, Defendant's drug use, in this case, is supported by his
behavior as well as his admission that he had been taking someone
else's medication.
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Plaintiff,

Roosevelt

City,

respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's
decision finding Defendant guilty.
DATED this

[**! day of April, 2010.
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys nor Appellee
Roos^elt C/ity
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